Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2020

Our Federalism on Drugs
Jonathan Adler
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, jonathan.adler@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons

Repository Citation
Adler, Jonathan, "Our Federalism on Drugs" (2020). Faculty Publications. 2056.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/2056

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

DRAFT – Not for Citation

Our Federalism on Drugs
Jonathan H. Adler
Forthcoming in MARIJUANA FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., Brookings Institution Press, 2020)
Abstract
Over the past decade, voters and legislatures have moved to legalize the possession of
marijuana under state law. Some have limited these reforms to the medicinal use of marijuana,
while others have not. Despite these reforms marijuana remains illegal under federal law.
Although the Justice Department has not sought to preempt or displace state-level reforms, the
federal prohibition casts a long shadow across state-level legalization efforts. This federal-state
conflict presents multiple important and challenging policy questions that often get overlooked in
policy debates over whether to legalize marijuana for medical or recreational purposes. Yet in a
“compound republic” like the United States, this federal-state conflict is particularly important if
one wishes to understand marijuana law and policy today. This brief essay is the introductory
chapter to Marijuana Federalism: Uncle Sam and Mary Jane (Jonathan H. Adler ed., Brookings
Institution Press, 2020), an edited volume that explores the legal and policy issues presented by
the federal-state conflict in marijuana law. It provides an overview of the relevant issues and a
survey of the remaining chapters in the volume.
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Just twenty-five years ago, marijuana was illegal throughout the United States. Beginning in the
1990s, several states, led by California, began to allow the cultivation, possession, and use of
cannabis for medicinal purposes, but they remained the exception. In the past decade, however,
the legal landscape for marijuana has been radically transformed as an increasing number of
states have rejected marijuana prohibition.
Colorado and Washington were the first states to withdraw fully from the federal war
against marijuana. In 2012, voters in both states approved ballot initiatives legalizing possession
of marijuana for recreational use and authorizing state regulation of marijuana production and
commercial sale. 1 Over the next six years, eight more states and the District of Columbia
followed suit. 2 Meanwhile, the possession and use of medical marijuana for medicinal purposes,
with a doctor’s recommendation, became legal in a majority of states, 3 while another dozen
states largely decriminalized personal possession of small amounts of marijuana. By 2019, only a
handful of states had failed to loosen legal restrictions on marijuana in some way.
These rapid changes in state marijuana policy both exploit and challenge American
federalism. While many states have rejected marijuana prohibition, the use, possession,
cultivation, and sale of marijuana remain illegal under federal law. 4 Marijuana is listed in
Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), where it was placed by Congress in 1970. 5
Cultivation and distribution of marijuana are felonies, and CSA violations may authorize asset
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seizure. 6 Those who use marijuana, even for medicinal purposes, may lose their ability to
purchase firearms 7 or dwell in public housing, 8 without regard for whether their use of marijuana
is sanctioned under state law. Marijuana-related businesses may not deduct the costs of running
their businesses for federal income taxes 9 and may be vulnerable to civil RICO suits. 10 Banks
and financial institutions, in particular, face tremendous legal uncertainty about the extent to
which they may provide services to marijuana-related businesses without exposing themselves to
legal jeopardy, 11 and it is unclear whether lawyers may counsel clients engaged in marijuanarelated business ventures without running afoul of state rules of professional responsibility. 12
Some also fear the legalization of marijuana sales in some jurisdictions could feed the black
market in other states.
The constitutional authority of the federal government to prohibit the possession and
distribution of marijuana was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 13 but the ability of the federal
government to enforce this policy on the ground is largely dependent on state cooperation. The
federal government is not responsible for the local cop on the beat, and federal law enforcement
agencies have neither the resources nor the inclination to try to enforce the federal marijuana
prohibition nationwide.
While the federal government has not prioritized enforcement of marijuana prohibition in
states that have adopted more permissive marijuana policies, it has not sought to preempt state
initiatives either, including those that affirmatively license and regulate a growing marijuana
industry. Congress, for its part, has made clear that it does not want federal law enforcement
efforts to interfere with state-level medical marijuana programs. While failing to enact legislation
to authorize or decriminalize medical marijuana where permissible under state law, Congress has
repeatedly prohibited federal law enforcement agencies from taking actions that could prevent
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states from “implementing” their own medical marijuana programs. As interpreted by federal
courts, these “appropriations riders” bar the federal prosecution of individuals for conduct that is
expressly permitted by state medical marijuana laws. 14 This is not a permanent condition,
however, as appropriations riders must be reenacted each year to remain effective.
Even before Congress limited federal enforcement efforts, state and local law
enforcement agencies were responsible for the overwhelming majority of marijuana law
enforcement. Whatever course federal policy takes, this is unlikely to change. There are
approximately four times as many state and local law enforcement officers within just two
states—Washington and Colorado—as there are Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents across the globe. 15 Nor can Congress or the executive branch compel state cooperation. 16
If state and local governments do not cooperate, the federal government must wage its war on
drugs without many foot soldiers.
For the most part, federal agencies have not shown much interest in interfering with statelevel reforms. In a series of memoranda issued during the Obama administration, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) sought to clarify federal enforcement priorities, deemphasizing federal
enforcement in states where marijuana possession is legal for some or all purposes. In 2009,
Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a memorandum indicating that the Justice
Department would focus its enforcement efforts on the production and distribution of marijuana
in an effort to curb trafficking, but would not devote significant resources to pursue those who
used or possessed marijuana in compliance with state laws allowing the use and possession of
marijuana for medicinal purposes. 17 A follow-up memorandum issued by Ogden’s successor,
James Cole, reaffirmed that, while the Justice Department was clarifying its enforcement
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priorities, the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana remained illegal under
federal law. 18
After Colorado and Washington voters passed their respective marijuana legalization
initiatives, the Justice Department maintained this position. In August 2013, Deputy Attorney
General Cole announced that the department would make no effort to block the implementation
of either initiative, nor was it the federal government’s position that state-level regulations of
marijuana were preempted by the CSA. 19 According to this memorandum, it was the Justice
Department’s view that the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana in
compliance with state laws was “less likely to threaten” federal priorities, such as curbing
interstate trafficking and preventing youth access. So long as this assumption holds, the second
Cole memorandum explained, “enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and
regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.” 20
Meanwhile, the DEA denied multiple petitions to reschedule marijuana under the CSA and ease
its treatment under federal law. 21
Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole memoranda in January 2018, but it is
unclear how much this changed things on the ground. While issuing a new memorandum
announcing “a return to the rule of law,” Attorney General Sessions disavowed any intention to
depart from traditional enforcement priorities. Federal prosecutors “haven’t been working small
marijuana cases before, they are not going to be working them now,” Sessions explained in a
2018 speech at the Georgetown University Law Center. 22 As he acknowledged, the Justice
Department could not take over routine enforcement of the federal marijuana prohibition even if
it so desired.
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In early 2019, Sessions’ successor, Attorney General William Barr, reaffirmed that the
Justice Department has little interest in trying to enforce marijuana prohibition in jurisdictions
that have chosen to legalize or decriminalize marijuana in some way. While peronsally opposed
to marijuana legalization, Barr told Congress that he did not wish to “upset settled expectations
and the reliance interest” that arose in the wake of the Cole memo. 23 At the same time, Barr
noted the status quo was “untenable,” and suggested federal legislation was necessary to smooth
out potential conflicts between state and federal law.
The insistence of multiple states on experimenting with various levels of marijuana
decriminalization or legalization raises a host of important and difficult legal questions, not the
least of which is how states can adopt marijuana polices preferred by local residents without
running afoul of federal law. 24 As a theoretical matter, the federalist structure of American
government would enable different jurisdictions to adopt laws in line with local conditions and
local preferences. As a practical matter, however, things have been more complicated.

Dual Sovereignty and Competitive Federalism
The constitutional structure of the United States is often referred to as one of “dual
sovereignty” 25—a system in which there are two distinct levels of government. The U.S.
Constitution creates a federal government of limited and enumerated powers. All other
powers, including the so-called “police power” to protect public health, safety, and the
general welfare, are left in the hands of state governments. 26 Federal law is supreme, but
the scope of federal power is limited.
This federalist structure leaves states with substantial latitude to enact laws and
regulations that conform with the needs and preferences of their citizens, thereby
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accounting for the diversity of views and preferences across the country. 27 California,
Texas, Vermont, and Alabama differ in many respects. Each of these states has a
different climate, different geography, and different demographics and populations with
different policy preferences. It should be no surprise that each of these jurisdictions has
adopted a different set of policies with regard to the use and distribution of marijuana.
In a large, heterogeneous republic in which different groups of people have
different priorities and preferences with regard to how the law should treat marijuana,
setting a single national policy increases the number of people who live under laws with
which they disagree. 28 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “In large centralized nations
the lawgiver is bound to give the laws a uniform character which does not fit the
diversity of places and of mores.” 29 On the other hand, allowing each jurisdiction to
adopt policies in line with the preferences of its citizens makes it more likely that more
people will live in jurisdictions with policies that match their preferences. 30
Alabama made precisely this point when California sought to defend the viability
of its medical marijuana laws in federal court. In Gonzales v. Raich, the state of Alabama
filed briefs urging the Supreme Court to hold that the federal government could not
prohibit the possession of marijuana for medicinal purposes where authorized by state
law. 31 While pointedly refusing to endorse the substance of California’s law allowing
medical marijuana use, Alabama urged the Court to allow different states to adopt
different marijuana policies. Although Alabama maintained some of the most punitive
marijuana possession laws in the country, it supported the ability of California to make a
different policy choice. 32
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Where allowed to operate, dual sovereignty creates a system of competitive
federalism in which states are under pressure to innovate in public policy. This may
encourage innovation, as states experiment with providing different bundles of policies
and services. At the same time, competitive federalism provides a means to discipline
states that overreach. 33 Those states that are more successful in providing a mix of laws
and amenities that are appealing to different groups of people will attract residents (who
are also taxpayers) and investment from other jurisdictions. States that impose policies
that are too costly or too restrictive will lose population and investment to other
jurisdictions on the margin as well. 34
These competitive pressures provide a potentially powerful discovery mechanism
to reveal the relative benefits and costs of different policy measures. In Justice Louis
Brandeis’s famous formulation, allowing states to enact competing policy measures frees
them to serve as “laboratories of democracy” in which policymakers may attempt “novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 35 Allowing
private possession and consumption of marijuana for medicinal or recreational purposes
may enhance individual welfare, or it may not. Such policies may expand human
freedom in meaningful ways without jeopardizing other public concerns, or it may not.
Reasonable people may disagree on these points. Allowing states to adopt different
policies can generate the empirical evidence necessary to inform, if not also resolve, such
disputes.
This discovery process may inform policymakers about the costs and benefits of
legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana. Legislators considering changing the marijuana
laws in their state can base their decision, in part, on the consequences of similar
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measures adopted in other jurisdictions. Perhaps more important, the practical
experiences of competing jurisdictions can reveal the relative costs and benefits of
adopting different approaches to marijuana law reform. The contours of a legal regime
and its implementation can be just as important as the underlying legal rule, and the
consequences of different rules, on the margin, can be particularly difficult to predict
without first putting them into practice.
While much of the policy debate centers on the binary choice between legalizing
use and maintaining prohibition, there are multiple margins along which existing laws
and policies may be reformed. How a given jurisdiction chooses to legalize or
decriminalize marijuana may be as important as whether a state chooses to move in this
direction. Not only do jurisdictions face choices about whether to legalize marijuana, and
for what uses, they also face choices about whether marijuana production and
distribution is to be a private commercial enterprise; whether the state will license
retailers or producers and, if so, under what conditions; how it is or is not to be regulated
or taxed; how potential risks to children or vulnerable populations will be addressed; how
the consequences of reform will be measured and assessed; and so on. Allowing different
jurisdictions to experiment with different combinations of reforms generates information
about the benefits and costs of different measures, thereby allowing marijuana policy
discussions to proceed on a more informed basis. Whatever the end result of this process
will be, marijuana policy will be better the more we allow this federalism-based
discovery process to operate.
While federalism, in principle, should create a framework for interjurisdictional
competition and discovery, federal law often gets in the way. The expansion of federal law, and
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federal criminal law in particular, has constrained the choices left to state policymakers and
foreclosed meaningful experimentation in many policy areas, dampening the discovery
mechanism competitive federalism can provide. 36 Insofar as federal law prohibits particular
conduct, states have less ability to experiment with different legal regimes and are less able to
discover whether alternative rules or restrictions would produce policy results more in line with
local preferences.

Striking a Balance
Questions about the proper balance between federal and state government have endured since the
nation’s founding. Marijuana policy is just the latest battleground in this longstanding conflict. It
is also an issue that could cut across traditional right-left political lines.
Drug policy reform is often seen as a “liberal” issue. Conservatives are expected to be
“tough on crime,” and voters who support marijuana legalization are more likely to support
Democratic political candidates. Yet many Democrats continue to oppose changes to marijuana
laws, 37 and it is those on the political right who are more likely to call for allowing states to
deviate from one-size-fits-all federal policies. On everything from environmental regulation to
education policy, Republican officeholders often argue that individual states should be free from
federal interference to adopt their own policy priorities.
In December 2014, Nebraska and Oklahoma both filed suit seeking to force the
preemption of Colorado’s Amendment 64. Both these states have been active champions
of state prerogatives, regularly challenging federal regulatory initiatives in other policy
areas. Here, however, the two states sought federal support to suppress Colorado’s
experiment with marijuana, arguing that Colorado’s decision to allow a legal market in
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marijuana threatened to impose a nuisance on neighboring jurisdictions. 38 Colorado’s
experience to date, however, suggests that state governments are capable of effectively
regulating intrastate marijuana markets. 39
Some of the more difficult legal questions confronting state efforts to legalize marijuana
involve the intersection between state law and the existing federal prohibition. Even if the federal
government decides to scale back marijuana law enforcement in non-prohibition states, federal
law remains federal law and it continues to have an effect. Banks, attorneys, and others are
bound to respect federal law even in the absence of conforming state laws, as the legalization of
a product by state law does not eliminate the federal prohibition. 40 Legalizing the possession and
use of marijuana by adults poses the risk that marijuana will become more accessible to
juveniles. 41 Just as some states may disagree with federal prohibition, some localities may
disagree with their states’ marijuana policy decisions, raising the question of whether marijuana
federalism should become marijuana localism. 42
The federal government has a legitimate interest in controlling interstate drug trafficking,
but no particular interest in prosecuting those who seek to provide medical marijuana to local
residents pursuant to state law. So it only makes sense for the Justice Department to tell federal
prosecutors to focus their efforts on those who are not in compliance with state law, such as
those who use medical marijuana distribution as a cover for other illegal activities, particularly
interstate drug trafficking. California should be free to set its own marijuana policy, but the
federal government retains an interest in preventing California’s choice from adversely affecting
neighboring states.
One possibility is for the federal government to treat marijuana like alcohol, retaining a
federal role in controlling illegal interstate trafficking but leaving each state entirely free to set its
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own marijuana policy, whether it be prohibition, decriminalization, or somewhere between. 43
Another alternative would be for the federal government to offer states waivers or enter into
cooperative agreements with states that seek to adopt alternative approaches to marijuana
policy. 44
When alcohol prohibition was repealed, states retained the ability to prohibit or regulate
alcohol, and the federal government focused on supporting state-level preferences by prohibiting
interstate shipment of alcohol in violation of applicable state laws. There is no clear reason why
a similar approach to marijuana would be less effective, though any such step would require
legislative reform.

Uncle Sam and Mary Jane
The aim of this book is to help inform the emerging debate over marijuana federalism by
identifying and clarifying many of the legal and policy issues that are at stake as these issues
work their way through our federal system.
The marijuana policy debate is rapidly evolving. As John Hudak and Christine Stenglein
detail, public opinion on marijuana has changed quite dramatically in a relatively short period of
time, driven in part by a widespread perception that marijuana is less dangerous than other illicit
substances. 45 As they note, public opinion may change as more people experience the
consequences of legalization – or it may not. According to Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard and
Jeffrey Miron, the effects of marijuana legalization in legalizing states, thus far, have been less
significant than both supporters and opponents predicted. 46
The fact that marijuana can be legal in some states while prohibited under federal law
may seem odd, but this is a key aspect of how our federalist system operates. As Ernest Young
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and Robert Mikos each explain, the federal government lacks the power to “commandeer” state
governments or police forces to implement federal law or policy priorities. 47 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle, which is why so much of marijuana policy “on the
ground” reflects state and local choices, and state resistance to federal priorities can be quite
profound. One might think that federal officeholders are obligated to make greater efforts to
enforce federal prohibition, but as Zachary Price explains, the Executive Branch retains ample
flexibility about how to deploy law enforcement resources—and this flexibility that has been
utilized by both the Obama and Trump Administrations. 48
Even if the federal government is not actively enforcing the federal prohibition on the
possession, distribution and sale of marijuana, the mere existence of the federal prohibition has
effects on businesses and professionals with their own obligations to comply with federal law.
As Julie Hill explains, federal marijuana prohibition has made it more difficult for banks to
provide banking services to marijuana-related businesses due to the demands of compliance with
banking laws. 49 And as Cassandra Robertson explains, the persistence of a federal prohibition
has forced attorneys, and those who evaluate and enforce rules of professional responsibility for
lawyers, to consider whether attorneys may provide legal services to marijuana-related
businesses without running afoul of their ethical obligations. 50
As noted above, much of the legal and policy tension between the federal and state
governments is a consequence of current constitutional doctrine, under which the scope of
federal power is determined independent of the actions taken by states. But need this be so? A
congressionally enacted statute could reorient the federal-state balance concerning marijuana, but
so could a shift in Supreme Court doctrine. As William Baude suggests, perhaps existing
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constitutional doctrine should be more solicitous of state actions and recognize limits on federal
power where states have productively occupied the field.
Whatever approach the federal government takes in the years ahead – and whether legal
reforms come from Congress or the courts – the marijuana policy debate today extends well
beyond whether to legalize cannabis for some or all purposes. Unless the federal government
takes action to remove legal obstacles to state-level reforms, various interjurisdictional conflicts
and legal quandaries will continue to arise. Administrative action, however popular with recent
presidents, is unlikely to be sufficient to resolve these conflicts. Legislative action of some sort
will be required eventually. Until then, this is our federalism on drugs, and it is going to be an
interesting trip.
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